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ABSTRACT 
In Capital in 21
st
 century, Thomas Piketty criticizes Marxian theory and the law of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall in the long term. His main argument, asserted by other 
authors since decades, is related to the capacity of increases in productivity to counterweight 
the tendency. The French author establishes a stable “rate of return” too, but this rate and his 
critics on Marx are founded on a neoclassical perspective. Thus Piketty denies the validity of 
the law but changing its determinations as a result of the labor theory of value and the 
valorization process. When a proper definition of the matter in Marxian terms is done, 
Piketty´s data itself confirm the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
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Introduction 
The work of Karl Marx has had a widespread influence in different academic disciplines. However, 
the interpretation of his work has been influenced by specific historical contexts.  The current global 
crisis has renewed interest in his theory and its implications for the analysis of economics and 
modern history. The latter has involved a growing debate, not only between the Marxist school and 
neoclassical and Keynesian schools, but also within Marxism.  
However, the crucial work of Marx, Capital, has seldom been considered in its real dimension. 
Throughout Capital, continuing the work of the classical economists of the theory of labor value as 
Smith and Ricardo, Marx unravels the determinations of the capitalist economy. 
Recently, Thomas Piketty´s book, Capital in 21st century, attempted to deny the conclusions 
reached by Marx in his work, despite the fact that Piketty outlines some vindication of partial 
aspects of Marx. But as often happens, this partial claim hides a strong condemnation of the general 
results implied in Marx's analysis of capitalism. This article does not intend to be a review of 
Capital in 21
st
 century, but can be read too as a demonstration of Piketty´s mislead of Marxian 
economics and its results which, as we´ll demonstrate later, are well supported by empirical data. 
Actually, by Piketty´s own data for the British and German cases.
1
  
The law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall 
Classical economists recognized in their own way the existence of this law of the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall. Marx, however, has the merit to create a coherent and complete explanation. 
Ricardo´s explanation was related to the increase in labor costs.  As Ricardo believed that 
agricultural production could expand only on worst lands, productivity in food manufacturing 
would fall, and being the main item consumed by the labor force, the cost of reproduction of the 
latter would be increased by reducing the share of profits in the product. However, the Ricardian 
assumption of a diminishing marginal productivity in agriculture (that neoclassical extrapolated to 
all productive activity) has proved unreal. The rate of profit shows a downward trend, not because 
productivity decreases, but precisely because it increases in historical terms.
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The necessity each capital has to sell at a lower price than competitors, and cover a larger market 
share, implies a constantly increasing expenditure mainly on fixed capital -equipment and 
infrastructure- which allows to increase productivity and to reduce the individual value of 
commodities, including the labor force. The relative growth of constant capital is given at the 
expense of variable capital for the reproduction of the labor force, the latter being the only source of 
profit. Capital thus finds its own internal limit. As such, its sole purpose is to increase the surplus 




These determinations of the rate of profit are expressed as profits (P) in the numerator and capital in 
the denominator (K) or, dividing all terms by variable capital, stressing too in the formula the 
relevance of labor force as value source, as the rate of surplus value (P/VC) and the value 
composition of capital (VCC): 
 
                                                RoP =     P     =      P/VC                                             (I) 
             K             VCC 
The downward trend in the rate of profit is not necessarily imposed in a steady pace, or is exempt 
from recovery periods. There are factors counteracting this trend, some of which have been 
identified by Marx (1999, 159-164) and Grossmann (2005, 72-131): cheapening of constant capital, 
payment of the labor force below its value, increasing turnover speed of circulating capital, capital 
export, foreign trade to expand markets, among others. Grossmann concludes that these 
countertendencies introduce cyclical trends on the long term one: "The operation of these 
countertendencies transforms the breakdown into a temporary crisis, so that the accumulation 
process is not something continuous but takes the form of periodic cycles"
4
. 
These counteracting factors may alleviate only in a relative way the decrease in the rate of profit on 
the long run. Their own characteristics, which initially tend to increase profitability, then get diluted 
or reversed in the opposite direction. For instance, if the cheapening of the elements of constant 
capital, reduces its relative value to variable capital, raising profitability, then will promote 
increased spending on constant capital, in the context of capitalist competition. In the case of capital 
export, in the new area where capital flows the capitalist accumulation process, despite its initial 
better accumulation conditions, tends to develop the same determinations and tendencies that in the 
exporting area. Thus, although initially this export of capital prevents its accumulation in the source 
area depresses even more the profit rate, even allowing a rise in the global profitability by 
increasing the rate in the new area, then accumulation trend continues to develop and is now 
expressed in both spaces, now falling the rate of profit in global terms.
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Authors who deny the law often argued that by increasing productivity and the rate of surplus value, 
capital compensates the increase of the composition and the previous fall of the rate of profit, 
resulting in a general indetermination that is intertwined with a characterization of economic cycles 
as detached from any general long-term trend. Capitalism then it would be an eternal repetition of 
mutually compensatory increases and decreases.
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Rosdolsky (1977, 408) asserted that those authors “overlook that the increase in the rate of profit 
secured by raising the intensity of the exploitation of labour is no abstract procedure or 
arithmetical operation; (…) the surplus labour which a worker can perform has definite limits. On 
the one hand, the length of the working day, and on the other, the part of the working day necessary 
for the reproduction of the workers themselves”.7  
Moreover, labor shares showed, despite the decrease in recent decades, a smooth upward trend on 
the long run, while net profits reduced their share due to increases in shares of consumption of fixed 
capital and net taxes. These trends are not considered by Piketty who has focused on national 
income rather than the gross domestic product, but national income represented in 1855-1874 
98,5% of GDP and just 88,4% in 1990-2009.
8
 The gross surplus value, leaving aside  net taxes, has 
to replenish the fixed capital transferred to ensure the continuity of the process of capitalist 
reproduction. Due to a long-term increase of fixed capital related to living labor, consumption of 
fixed capital CFK will tend to extend its share on GDP. The reduction of net profits is progressively 
related to the accumulation of capital itself. This is not a casual relation, but the historical trend to 
over-accumulation of capital expressed in the functional distribution. So, surplus value rate, as net 
profits/wages, has indeed been decreasing. 
In Marx's terms, downward trend on the rate of profit would take place regardless of a decline or 
stagnation in wages relative to profits, i.e., a rate of surplus value (profits/variable capital) constant 
or increasing:  
“This mode of production produces a progressive relative decrease of the variable capital as 
compared to the constant capital, and consequently a continuously rising organic composition 
of the total capital. The immediate result of this is that the rate of surplus-value, at the same, 
or even a rising, degree of labour exploitation, is represented by a continually falling general 
rate of profit. The progressive tendency of the general rate of profit to fail is, therefore, just an 
expression peculiar to the capitalist mode of production of the progressive development of the 
social productivity of labour”.9 
Another expression of the relation between the cyclical crisis and the downward trend in the rate of 
profit is given by the concentration and centralisation of capital, the mechanism by which, during 
crisis, capital increases its productive force absorbing or leaving out of competition the less 
concentrated ones. As a counterpart to the downward trend in the rate of profit, historical trend in 
concentration and centralisation of capital, also ignored by critics in this regard, has developed and 
currently reaches enormous proportions worldwide
10
.  
In conclusion, the law expresses the historical transience of capital as a mode of production and its 
historical limits. Nonetheless, the debates on this issue lacked of empirical support. In the next 
section, considering the German and British case and demonstrate with Piketty´s own data the 
tendential fall in the rate of profit and the reasons and definitions that Piketty introduce to assert a 
flat and stable trend in his “rate of return”. The results strongly support the law of the tendential fall 
in the rate of profit, despite a smooth recovery in last decades. 
 
Piketty´s stable “rate of return” and the Marxian rate of profit 
In first place, Piketty's critique of Marx is based on assertions with no real relation to Marxian 
economics due to Piketty´s confessed own lack of read. According to the French economist, “like 
his predecessors, Marx totally neglected the possibility of durable technological progress and 
steadily increasing productivity, which is a force that can to some extent serve as a counterweight 
to the process of accumulation and concentration of private capital”11.  
Above we have developed some arguments against this kind of objections. Piketty claims, like other 
authors previously mentioned, that productivity (the rate of surplus, or even GDP per capita) may 
counterweight the downward trend. According to Marxian theory, this could be the case for some 
periods, but not the long term. Beyond the latter, the Marxian theory clearly states that the decline 
in profitability in the long term is closely related to the increase in productivity, so the argument set 
out by Piketty corresponds more to a misreading of Marx´s work than to Marx's work itself. There 
is no contradiction between the tendency to fall in the rate of profit and increase in productivity. 
On the other hand, Piketty asserts that the rate of profit in the long term both in France and Great 
Britain “has oscillated around a central value of 4-5 percent a year, or more generally in an 
interval from 3-6 percent a year. There has been no pronounced long-term trend either upward or 
downward”12. It also seems to be the case for other countries like Germany. 
However, Piketty´s “rate of return” consider “capital”, in the denominator of the equation, as a 
synonymous of “wealth”.  
“I define “national wealth” or “national capital” as the total market value of everything 
owned by the residents and government of a given country at a given point in time, provided 
that it can be traded on some market. It consists of the sum total of nonfinancial assets (land, 
dwellings, commercial inventory, other buildings, machinery, infrastructure, patents, and 
other directly owned professional assets) and financial assets (bank accounts, mutual funds, 
bonds, stocks, financial investments of all kinds, insurance policies, pension funds, etc.), less 
the total amount of financial liabilities (debt)”13. 
The author is fully aware of some implications of this definition related to his particular perspective 
influenced by neoclassical theory. But Marx´s approach has no relation with that particular 
definition of capital. Moreover, in Marxian terms the rate of profit is calculated considering 
productive assets, conventionally machines and equipment, infrastructure and non-residencial 
buildings. Thus Piketty denies the validity of the law of the tendency to fall of the rate of profit but 
changing its determinations as a result of the labor theory of value and the valorization process.  
The capitalist production process is a valorization process (M - M') through the exploitation of the 
labor force (M - C ... P ... - C ' - M'). The capital advanced in the form of money (M) is exchanged 
for commodities (C) - means of production, inputs (constant capital, CC) and labor (variable capital, 
VC) - . The labor force, unlike the means of production and inputs, has the power to generate an 
additional value that required to its own reproduction. Thus, the production process itself (P) in 
which the labor force, using the means of production, transforms inputs is realized, resulting in a 
mass of commodities of a greater value than the prior (M '). In the final product appears transferred 
this constant capital employee, plus an additional amount generated by labor force, equal to variable 
capital (reproduction value of labor force) exchanged with the capitalist, and a surplus-value. Thus 
capital transmutes from money-capital to commodity-capital, then productive-capital, to finally 
return to the form of commodity-capital and money-capital of a greater value. This last step is the 
one that involves the sale on the market (C'-M '), the realization of the profit and the completion of 
the valorization process.  
Fixed capital, consisting of means of production, increases from the succession of this circuit that 
allows the valorization of capital in general, from M to M ', but performing the entire circuit which 
implies, by the way, successive shapes taking by capital: money-capital, commodity-capital, 
productive-capital.  
In the vision of Piketty, capital is not related to the production or valorization process. As a 
synonym for the word “wealth”, any good or service exchangeable in the market is capital. But the 
trends described by Marx refer to capitalist production. In this respect, any assessment of Marxian 
theory, even its empirical validation, has to consider this basic aspect in its analysis. In such a way, 
“dwellings” should not be considered part of the capital, as particular consumer goods rather than 
means of production. Similar considerations may be stated in other cases like “financial assets” (a 
pure circuit M-M´) or “land”. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Piketty (2014). 
Ironically, using Piketty´s own data we can express the historical evolution of the rate of profit in a 
Marxian sense, which presents a clear downward trend and strongly denies what Piketty asserted. In 
Figure N°1, “total capital income” of Piketty has been divided by “total private wealth” (similar to 
his own “rate of return”) and by “business assets”, both in current terms, available in Piketty´s 
dataset for Germany (tables DATADE1C for 1868-1939, and DATADE2B -Machinery and Other 
Buildings- for 1950-2011).  
 












































































































































































































Figure 1 - Piketty rate of return and rate of profit, Germany (1868-2011)








































































































































Figure 2 - Piketty´s rate of return and rate of profit, United Kingdom (1855-2009)
Piketty RoP Линейная (Piketty) Линейная (RoP)
For the British case, in Figure N°2, we used Piketty´s stats on “total capital income” share (table 
UK11A) and “total private wealth” (table UK1, in 2010 billion pounds) for his “rate of return”, and 
official series of ONS for real productive capital for the rate of profit. This estimation is, as Piketty 
consider the right way, in real terms. In nominal or current terms, the right way in Marxian terms, 
the downward trend is a little bit less pronounced because constant capital cheapening effect is 
cancelled as relative prices of investment and output are excluded. 
Conclusions 
Despite the unfounded critics on Marx in Capital in 21
st
 century, in this article the law of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall has been empirically validated with Piketty´s data.  On the other 
hand, as we mentioned above, the French economist aimed to discredit this Marxian law but 
introducing a neoclassical definition of capital that affects the estimations. As a result, his “rate of 
return” shows, both in Germany and United Kingdom, a smooth upward trend. 
Piketty´s critics on Marx related to a counterweight by productivity increases which cancel the 
downward trend just mislead the matter. Profitability in capitalism tends to fall despite, or even 
with, productivity increases. This is a basic conclusion of Marx´s Capital. 
Across the relative stability on Piketty´s rate, his “capital” shares changed in the long run. In XIX 
century and first decades of the XX, “land” and other items, which does not take part in a Marxian 
definition of productive capital, has a longer share. In last decades, machinery and non-residential 
buildings showed a larger relative increase. For this reason, levels of Piketty´s and Marxian rates 
show some convergence in the long term. And for that reason too, Piketty´s “rate of return” will 
probably continue to show a “Marxian” downward trend like it showed since the sixties (see 
Figures N°1 and N°2). 
Finally, Piketty´s “rate of return” doesn´t show any relation with history or historical development 
of capitalism. In this sense, logically, Piketty seems to consider, for instance, World War I and II as 
external events related to capitalism. In fact, this a-historical approach and naturalization of 
capitalism leads Piketty to state a “rate of return” for ancient civilizations. And a rate that has an 
eternal entity could be hardly related with the historical development of the capitalist mode of 
production and its inherent tendency. 
 
 
Statistical Annex  
Piketty´s Rate of Return (P-RoR, Total capital income / Total private wealth) and Rate of 
Profit (RoP, Total capital income / Fixed Capital). 
GERMANY 1868-2011 
  P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP 
1868 3,6% 33,8% 1904 4,3% 19,9% 1940     1976 8,2% 9,9% 
1869 2,9% 26,8% 1905 4,6% 20,7% 1941     1977 7,9% 9,8% 
1870 2,5% 23,7% 1906 4,6% 19,5% 1942     1978 7,6% 9,9% 
1871 2,8% 24,2% 1907 4,5% 17,9% 1943     1979 7,6% 10,0% 
1872 2,9% 21,0% 1908 4,3% 17,3% 1944     1980 7,0% 8,9% 
1873 2,7% 18,0% 1909 4,3% 18,8% 1945     1981 6,7% 8,3% 
1874 2,9% 20,1% 1910 4,5% 19,6% 1946     1982 6,6% 8,2% 
1875 2,2% 16,7% 1911 4,5% 19,1% 1947     1983 7,0% 9,2% 
1876 2,4% 19,7% 1912 4,7% 19,2% 1948     1984 7,3% 9,8% 
1877 2,7% 23,1% 1913 4,5% 17,7% 1949     1985 7,4% 10,3% 
1878 2,8% 24,4% 1914     1950 10,2% 12,8% 1986 7,4% 10,7% 
1879 2,7% 24,8% 1915     1951 11,2% 14,7% 1987 6,9% 10,2% 
1880 3,2% 28,6% 1916     1952 12,5% 15,0% 1988 7,6% 11,4% 
1881 3,1% 27,1% 1917     1953 12,0% 14,6% 1989 7,9% 12,2% 
1882 3,0% 25,4% 1918     1954 11,3% 14,5% 1990 8,3% 12,7% 
1883 3,3% 27,2% 1919     1955 12,9% 16,5% 1991 8,0% 13,1% 
1884 3,3% 27,6% 1920     1956 13,4% 15,9% 1992 7,6% 12,4% 
1885 3,2% 26,5% 1921     1957 13,9% 15,9% 1993 7,0% 11,4% 
1886 3,1% 25,5% 1922     1958 13,1% 15,1% 1994 7,4% 12,1% 
1887 3,3% 26,7% 1923     1959 13,4% 15,5% 1995 7,7% 12,8% 
1888 3,4% 25,2% 1924     1960 13,5% 16,4% 1996 7,6% 12,9% 
1889 3,5% 24,0% 1925 7,3% 13,8% 1961 11,5% 14,5% 1997 7,7% 13,6% 
1890 4,0% 24,7% 1926 7,3% 14,1% 1962 10,7% 13,2% 1998 7,6% 14,0% 
1891 3,6% 22,0% 1927 7,9% 15,0% 1963 10,1% 12,3% 1999 7,1% 13,4% 
1892 4,0% 25,3% 1928 7,9% 14,2% 1964 10,2% 12,5% 2000 6,7% 13,1% 
1893 4,0% 25,8% 1929 7,3% 13,1% 1965 10,0% 12,3% 2001 6,8% 13,3% 
1894 3,8% 24,8% 1930 6,3% 11,2% 1966 9,3% 11,5% 2002 6,8% 13,5% 
1895 3,8% 24,1% 1931 4,9% 8,7% 1967 8,6% 10,8% 2003 6,9% 14,2% 
1896 4,0% 23,5% 1932 4,3% 7,6% 1968 9,3% 12,6% 2004 7,7% 16,6% 
1897 4,3% 24,0% 1933 4,9% 8,9% 1969 9,2% 13,0% 2005 7,8% 17,3% 
1898 4,6% 23,9% 1934 6,2% 11,5% 1970 9,0% 11,8% 2006 8,5% 19,4% 
1899 4,4% 20,3% 1935 7,1% 13,6% 1971 8,7% 10,7% 2007 8,6% 20,1% 
1900 4,3% 17,6% 1936 7,9% 15,5% 1972 8,5% 10,2% 2008 7,9% 18,1% 
1901 3,9% 16,2% 1937 9,4% 18,6% 1973 8,3% 10,0% 2009 6,6% 14,9% 
1902 4,1% 19,0% 1938 10,1% 19,7% 1974 7,8% 9,2% 2010 7,1% 16,5% 
1903 4,2% 20,0% 1939     1975 7,7% 9,0% 2011 7,0% 16,5% 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 1855-2009 
  P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP   P-RoR RoP 
1855 4,3% 36,2% 1894 4,8% 34,2% 1933 4,5% 15,8% 1972 5,9% 9,1% 
1856 4,6% 38,4% 1895 4,9% 34,6% 1934 4,7% 18,6% 1973 6,5% 11,1% 
1857 4,8% 39,3% 1896 4,8% 35,0% 1935 4,8% 19,8% 1974 5,3% 9,5% 
1858 5,3% 40,2% 1897 4,9% 34,7% 1936 5,3% 20,5% 1975 4,9% 7,8% 
1859 5,0% 38,7% 1898 5,1% 35,6% 1937 5,8% 22,1% 1976 6,1% 8,8% 
1860 4,8% 38,5% 1899 5,3% 36,2% 1938 5,7% 23,4% 1977 7,1% 10,2% 
1861 5,2% 41,0% 1900 4,8% 34,0% 1939 6,3% 22,0% 1978 6,8% 9,4% 
1862 5,5% 41,1% 1901 4,6% 32,9% 1940 6,4% 23,1% 1979 6,1% 8,9% 
1863 5,8% 41,2% 1902 4,8% 32,1% 1941 6,1% 29,8% 1980 5,4% 6,8% 
1864 5,8% 40,7% 1903 4,4% 30,0% 1942 6,0% 29,8% 1981 5,6% 5,3% 
1865 5,6% 40,5% 1904 4,4% 29,4% 1943 5,6% 31,5% 1982 6,2% 6,1% 
1866 5,1% 39,3% 1905 4,8% 29,9% 1944 5,1% 29,1% 1983 6,9% 6,6% 
1867 4,5% 37,2% 1906 5,2% 30,7% 1945 4,8% 26,0% 1984 6,9% 6,9% 
1868 4,5% 38,8% 1907 5,3% 30,6% 1946 5,1% 21,7% 1985 7,0% 7,6% 
1869 4,8% 38,8% 1908 4,9% 28,5% 1947 7,0% 21,8% 1986 6,5% 7,4% 
1870 5,2% 43,3% 1909 4,9% 29,1% 1948 7,6% 24,2% 1987 6,1% 7,2% 
1871 5,5% 45,8% 1910 5,1% 29,2% 1949 7,9% 23,6% 1988 5,9% 7,0% 
1872 5,0% 42,4% 1911 5,3% 30,0% 1950 7,7% 23,3% 1989 5,2% 6,7% 
1873 4,9% 40,9% 1912 5,4% 30,6% 1951 7,9% 21,7% 1990 4,8% 6,3% 
1874 4,8% 41,0% 1913 5,5% 31,7% 1952 8,6% 21,2% 1991 4,4% 5,3% 
1875 4,7% 39,3% 1914 6,1% 30,0% 1953 9,1% 21,9% 1992 4,6% 4,9% 
1876 4,5% 37,3% 1915 7,2% 27,6% 1954 9,2% 21,1% 1993 5,1% 6,2% 
1877 4,4% 35,9% 1916 9,2% 27,3% 1955 8,6% 19,9% 1994 6,0% 7,0% 
1878 4,4% 35,3% 1917 8,8% 29,6% 1956 8,5% 18,1% 1995 6,3% 7,2% 
1879 4,4% 33,5% 1918 8,2% 32,8% 1957 8,4% 17,4% 1996 6,6% 8,0% 
1880 4,7% 36,9% 1919 8,7% 26,7% 1958 8,4% 17,0% 1997 6,5% 7,5% 
1881 4,9% 36,9% 1920 6,6% 22,9% 1959 8,5% 17,1% 1998 6,1% 7,7% 
1882 4,9% 35,6% 1921 5,0% 18,3% 1960 8,9% 17,7% 1999 5,0% 7,8% 
1883 4,6% 35,1% 1922 6,4% 18,0% 1961 8,3% 16,5% 2000 4,5% 6,5% 
1884 4,6% 34,1% 1923 6,3% 16,9% 1962 8,0% 15,6% 2001 4,6% 6,4% 
1885 4,7% 33,6% 1924 6,3% 17,0% 1963 7,3% 13,9% 2002 5,3% 6,1% 
1886 5,0% 34,5% 1925 6,4% 20,2% 1964 7,4% 13,9% 2003 5,5% 5,8% 
1887 5,1% 35,1% 1926 6,1% 18,0% 1965 7,6% 15,0% 2004 5,4% 5,5% 
1888 5,3% 36,1% 1927 6,2% 18,7% 1966 7,0% 8,1% 2005 5,3% 5,3% 
1889 5,2% 35,8% 1928 6,4% 19,6% 1967 7,0% 11,7% 2006 5,1% 5,1% 
1890 5,0% 35,0% 1929 6,7% 20,5% 1968 7,2% 11,0% 2007 5,3% 5,1% 
1891 4,5% 34,6% 1930 6,3% 21,6% 1969 7,3% 10,0% 2008 5,7% 5,7% 
1892 4,2% 32,6% 1931 5,4% 17,9% 1970 6,7% 6,7% 2009 4,9% 4,6% 
1893 4,1% 32,0% 1932 4,6% 17,1% 1971 6,3% 8,7%       
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1
 Indeed, apparently Piketty has not read Capital by Marx, as he mentioned in an interview with New 
Republic (http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117655/thomas-piketty-interview-economist-discusses-his-
distaste-marx). Piketty asserted: “I never managed really to read it”. Unfortunately, most of the critics of 
Marx made a superficial reading of his work, criticizing, in the best case, the caricature of Marx that they 
have built. In this case the contrast between the total lack of Marx reading and the obvious reminiscence in 
the book title of Piketty is, at least, striking and disconcerting, presumably more related to marketing 
strategies. 
2
 “A fall in the rate of profit and accelerated accumulation are different expressions of the same process only 
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